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Education in the practical applications of logic and proving such as the formal specification and
verification of computer programs is substantially hampered by the fact that most time and effort
that is invested in proving is actually wasted in vain: because of errors in the specifications respec-
tively algorithms that students have developed, their proof attempts are often pointless (because the
proposition proved is actually not of interest) or a priori doomed to fail (because the proposition to be
proved does actually not hold); this is a frequent source of frustration and gives formal methods a bad
reputation. RISCAL (RISC Algorithm Language) is a formal specification language and associated
software system that attempts to overcome this problem by making logic formalization fun rather
than a burden. To this end, RISCAL allows students to easily validate the correctness of instances
of propositions respectively algorithms by automatically evaluating/executing and checking them on
(small) finite models. Thus many/most errors can be quickly detected and subsequent proof attempts
can be focused on propositions that are more/most likely to be both meaningful and true.
1 Introduction
From a student’s perspective, education in the practical applications of logic and proving (such as the
formal specification of a computational problem, the development of an algorithm that is supposed to
solve this problem, and the formal verification that the algorithm indeed implements the specification) is
often a source of frustration: on the one hand, the specification that she writes may be too weak (some-
times even trivially satisfied) such that a successful verification may be of little value (sometimes even
completely pointless); on the other hand, she may waste a lot of time in proof attempts that are a priori
doomed to fail due to a variety of possible “show-stoppers”: her specification may be too strong (some-
times even not implementable), her algorithm may not implement the specification, and the additional
information that she has to provide for the derivation of verification conditions (in particular annotations
of loops by invariants) may be not adequate (invariants may be too strong or too weak). To the student
it would thus be very re-assuring, if formal definitions, specifications, algorithms, and annotations could
be (quickly) validated to find out apparent errors before starting any (costly) proof attempts.
Of course, to establish the truth of a proposition interpreted over an infinite domain generally re-
quires a symbolic proof (which cannot be fully automated, thus most program verification environments
make use of interactive proof assistants rather than just relying on automated provers); propositions over
finite domains, however, can be automatically checked without proof by systematically enumerating all
possible values for the quantified variables of a formula. The problem then, however, is that propositions
over finite domains are not necessarily semantically connected to corresponding formulas over infinite
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domains; for instance, the formula (∀x. ∃y. y > x) is true when interpreted over the infinite set N of
natural numbers but false when interpreted over every finite subset of N.
To overcome this problem, we may restrict all variables to finite types whose sizes are bounded
by some parameter n ∈ N (or multiple such parameters); the specification is thus interpreted over a
domain that is finite but of arbitrary size. It may then involve a formula (∀x ∈ N[n]. F) where N[n]
denotes all natural numbers less than equal n. If we instantiate n with, say, 5, we get a formula instance
(∀x ∈ N[5]. F) that can be effectively evaluated; thus all specifications and annotations of programs can
be effectively checked during the execution of the program (runtime assertion checking). Furthermore,
since also the domains of program variables are correspondingly restricted, we can effectively execute a
program and check its annotations for all possible inputs (model checking); only if we do not find errors,
the verification of the general specification may be attempted, e.g. the proof of (∀n ∈ N. ∀x ∈ N[n]. F).
Based on this idea and prior expertise with computer-supported program verification especially in
educational scenarios [17, 18], we have developed the specification language RISCAL (RISC Algorithm
Language) and associated software system [15, 19]. RISCAL has been designed in such a way that
• every type has (arbitrarily many but) only finitely many values, and thus
• every language construct is executable, and thus
• every constant, function, predicate, theorem, procedure can be evaluated.
While every RISCAL type such as N[n] is finite, it may depend on a constant n not defined in the specifi-
cation; thus the specification denotes an infinite class of models of which every instance (corresponding
to every concrete values of n) is finite and executable. With RISCAL we may thus validate some model
instances before attempting to prove the correctness of all models (for arbitrary values of n).
RISCAL is intended to model, rather than low-level program code, high-level algorithms as can be
found in textbooks on discrete mathematics. It thus provides a richer collection of built-in data types (e.g.,
sets and maps) and operations (e.g., quantified formulas as program conditions and implicit definitions of
values by formulas) than can be typically found in real programming languages; in particular, RISCAL
also supports various non-deterministic phrases based on the choice of a value with a determining prop-
erty. This enables the implicit definition of functions respectively of non-deterministic algorithms that
have not necessarily a uniquely defined result. The current version of the RISCAL software supports
model checking of formulas, specifications, and algorithms via the runtime assertion checking of all pos-
sible executions, based on the executability of all specifications and annotations (further automatic mech-
anisms based on SMT solving and interactive proofs with the help of proving assistants will be added in
the future). The implementation allows to lazily evaluate/execute all possible evaluation/execution paths
in non-deterministic expressions/statements and have theorems and algorithms checked in each path.
RISCAL is related to a large body of prior research; we only give a short account of the work that
seems most relevant, mainly focusing on approaches that allow students to validate formulas, specifi-
cations, algorithms not only by symbolic proving. For instance, the classic software system Tarski’s
World [6] has applied a visual approach: it demonstrates the semantics of first-order logic through games
in which three-dimensional worlds are populated with various geometric figures that test the truth of
logic formulas; however, this framework is oriented towards beginners and has limited expressiveness.
Various languages of automated reasoning systems have some executable flavor, which allows to
evaluate formal definitions, e.g., the formal proof management system Coq [2], the generic proof as-
sistant Isabelle [14] (which has been, e.g., used to define the formal semantics of a simple imperative
programming language in executable form [13]), or the system Theorema [4] for computer supported
mathematical theorem proving (which considers computing as a special form of proving). As for al-
gorithm languages, Alloy [9] is a language for describing structures and their relationships based on a
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relational logic; the Alloy Analyzer is a satisfiability solver that finds structures satisfying certain con-
straints. The formal method Event-B and the supporting Rodin system [1] have been developed for
the modeling and analysis of systems, based on set theory as a modeling notation and the concept of
refinement to represent systems at different abstraction levels. The specification language TLA+ for de-
scribing concurrent systems [10] and the corresponding algorithm language PlusCal are supported by
the TLC model checker. Also the Vienna Development Method VDM [11] provides an expressive lan-
guage for modeling algorithms and supports by its software Overture the testing of specifications. As for
real programming languages with support for formal specification, the programming language WhyML
of the verification environment Why3 [7] and Microsoft’s programming language Dafny [12] provide a
rich variety of built-in specification constructs; however, both WhyML and Dafny do not support model
checking. Also for industrially supported languages, in particular around the Java Modeling Language
(JML) for the formal specification of Java programs, an ecosystem of supporting tools has been devel-
oped [5], including runtime assertion checkers, extended static checkers, and full-fledged verifiers.
The thesis [16] has evaluated various of the languages and tools mentioned above with respect to
their suitability for specifying and verifying mathematical algorithms; ultimately it favored, with some
reservations, PlusCal and VDM. PlusCal is attractive because of its roots in first-order logic and set the-
ory. However, by its heritage from TLA+, PlusCal has no static type system, no possibility to directly
specify algorithm contracts and annotations, and it does not support recursion; also models are not nec-
essarily restricted to finite size such that model checks may not terminate. VDM/Overture mainly aims at
the development and analysis of models of complex systems and the generation of executable code from
specifications, but it is generally also suitable for the purpose addressed by RISCAL. However, because
its type system is based on infinite types, it does not really support exhaustive model checking but only
(combinatorial) testing where the developer has to explicitly specify sets of executions to be performed
and annotations be checked; also there is no direct support for the formulation/checking of mathematical
theorems. Furthermore, execution is deterministic such that e.g. in non-deterministic choices always the
first values (or optionally a random value) is chosen. Quantified constructs are executable only if the
bound variables take values from user-defined finite collections (sets or sequences), and it is not possible
to directly annotate loops with invariants (only global system/type invariants are supported).
The development of RISCAL has been triggered and shaped by above findings. Compared with the
approaches mentioned, only RISCAL supports a rich language for conveniently defining mathematical
theories and specifying, modeling, and annotating (potentially non-deterministic) algorithms that is both
fully checkable and semantically linked to arbitrarily sized models. Furthermore, we are convinced that
the RISCAL software is by far the most streamlined and easiest to use for our purposes. So far, RISCAL
has been used to formalize algorithms in number theory [8], discrete mathematics [3], computer algebra,
and logic. It is currently applied in a course on “Formal Methods in Software Development” for master
programmes in computer science and mathematics. The ultimate goal is to build up a comprehensive
library and accompanying lecture materials; furthermore, due to the immediate feedback of the system
about the correctness of theorems and algorithms, we envision RISCAL as an ideal vehicle for self-
directed and self-paced learning in STEM education. Students have already given very positive feedback
how natural the use of the system feels and how easy it is to play with formal specifications.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an overview on the RISCAL
specification language and associated software system. Section 3 outlines the envisioned strategy of
applying RISCAL in education on the formalization of theories and algorithms. Section 4 describes first
attempts on the development of formal specification libraries in various mathematical domains. Section 5
concludes and discusses our plans on the further development and application of RISCAL.
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Figure 1: The RISCAL System
2 The RISCAL Language and System
In this section, we give a short account of the RISCAL language and software system; for more details,
see the tutorial and reference manual [19].
System The user interface of the RISCAL software system is depicted in Figure 1; it contains an editor
frame for RISCAL specifications on the left and the control widgets and output frame of the checker
on the right. The RISCAL specification language is based on a statically typed variant of first order
predicate logic. On the one hand, it allows to develop mathematical theories such as that of the greatest
common divisor depicted at the top of Figure 2; on the other hand, it also enables the specification of
algorithms such as Euclid’s algorithm depicted in the same figure below (theory and specification will
be discussed later). The lexical syntax of the language includes Unicode characters for common mathe-
matical symbols; these may be entered in the RISCAL editor via ASCII shortcuts; e.g., the character ∀
is entered by first typing the text forall and then pressing the keys <Ctrl> and # simultaneously.
Language RISCAL specifications consist of declarations of the following kinds of entities:
Types type I = T introduces a named type I defined by the type expression T ; types include booleans,
integers, sets, tuples, records, arrays, and maps (partial functions). All types are finite, e.g., for
integer constants N and M with N ≤ M the type Z[N,M] denotes the type of all integers in the
interval [N,M] while Array[N,T] denotes the type of all arrays of length N ≥ 0 with elements of
type T . Recursive (algebraic) data types (whose values are terms of a finite depth N ≥ 0) may be
introduced by a declaration rectype(N) T = c(T1,...,Tn) | ... .
Constants val I:N introduces an unspecified natural number constant I while val I:T = E intro-
duces a constant I of type T which is explicitly defined by a term E. Terms can be composed from
a rich variety of built-in functions and quantifiers, e.g. the term (∑x:N[N] with x%26=0. x·x)
denotes the sum of the squares of all odd natural numbers less than equal N.
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val N: N; type nat = N[N];
pred divides(m:nat,n:nat) ⇔ ∃p:nat. m·p = n;
fun gcd(m:nat,n:nat): nat
requires m 6= 0 ∨ n 6= 0;
= choose result:nat with
divides(result,m) ∧ divides(result,n) ∧
¬∃r:nat. divides(r,m) ∧ divides(r,n) ∧ r > result;
theorem gcd0(m:nat) ⇔ m 6=0 ⇒ gcd(m,0) = m;
theorem gcd1(m:nat,n:nat) ⇔ m 6= 0 ∨ n 6= 0 ⇒ gcd(m,n) = gcd(n,m);
theorem gcd2(m:nat,n:nat) ⇔ 1 ≤ n ∧ n ≤ m ⇒ gcd(m,n) = gcd(m%n,n);
proc gcdp(m:nat,n:nat): nat
requires m 6=0 ∨ n 6=0;
ensures result = gcd(m,n);
{
var a:nat := m; var b:nat := n;
while a > 0 ∧ b > 0 do
invariant gcd(a,b) = gcd(old_a,old_b);
decreases a+b;
{
if a > b then a := a%b; else b := b%a;
}
return if a = 0 then b else a;
}
Figure 2: Euclid’s Algorithm in RISCAL
Functions and Predicates fun I(...):T = E introduces a function I with result type T ; the result
value is defined by expression E of type T ; correspondingly, pred I(...) ⇔ F defines a pred-
icate I, i.e., a Boolean-valued function whose result is defined by formula F (an expression of type
Bool). Formulas can be written in a notation that is close to typical mathematical practice, e.g.,
(∀x:N[N],y:N[N]. x ≤ y ⇒ ∃z:Nat. z ≤ y ∧ x+z = y) is such a formula.
Theorems theorem I ⇔ F introduces a Boolean constant I whose value is defined by a formula F ;
this declaration asserts that the value of I is true, i.e., that F is valid. Likewise theorem I(...)
⇔ F introduces a predicate I defined by formula F ; this declaration asserts that F is valid for all
possible parameter values, i.e., F is implicitly universally quantified.
Procedures proc I(...):T { C; return E; } introduces a procedure I with result type T . A pro-
cedure is a function whose result value is determined by the execution of command C; this es-
tablishes a context (determined by the values of modifiable variables in the procedure) in which
the value of expression E is evaluated to denote the result value. Commands support the usual
algorithmic constructs like variable assignments, command sequences, and various forms of con-
ditionals and loops. Loops may be annotated by invariant F to indicate that formula F is true
before and after every iteration of the loop; the annotation decreases E indicates that the value
of the termination measure E (a natural number expression) is decreased in every iteration. A
command assert F indicates that formula F is true when the command is executed.
Parameterized entities may be annotated by preconditions of form requires F which states that
only those parameter values are legal that satisfy formula F ; correspondingly annotation ensures F
states that only a result (denoted by the keyword result) is legal that satisfies F . These entities may
be also defined recursively; by an annotation decreases E a termination measure E is stated, i.e., an
expression E that evaluates to a natural number which is decreased in every recursive invocation.
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The algorithmic language RISCAL also supports non-deterministic expression evaluations respec-
tively command executions, which may considerably simplify the formulation of many algorithms. For
instance, the term (choose I:T with F) denotes some value I of type T that satisfies formula F ; if no
such value exists, the value of the term is undefined. A corresponding command introduces a constant I
with that property into the current context. The conditional command choose ... then C1 else C2
executes command C1, if such a constant exists, and C2, otherwise; the loop choose ... do C per-
forms the choice repeatedly and terminates when no more choice is possible. The loop for ... do C
executes the body C for all possible choices in an unspecified order.
Example The specification listed in Figure 2 introduces the mathematical theory of the greatest com-
mon divisor and its computation by the Euclidean algorithm; this theory is restricted to the domain of all
natural numbers less than equal N:
• The theory first introduces the undefined constant N which is then used as the domain bound of
the type N[N] subsequently called nat.
• It then defines a predicate divides(m,n) which denotes m|n (m divides n) and subsequently
a function gcd(m,n) which denotes the greatest common divisor of m and n. This function is
introduced by an implicit definition: for any m,n with m 6= 0 or n 6= 0, its result is the largest value
result that divides both m and n.
• The theorems gcd0(m), gcd1(m,n), and gcd2(m,n) describe the essential mathematical propo-
sitions on which the correctness proof of the Euclidean algorithm is based.
• The procedure gcdp(m,n) embeds an iterative implementation of the Euclidean algorithm. Its
contract specified by the clauses requires and ensures states that the procedure behaves ex-
actly as the implicitly defined function; the loop annotations invariant and decreases describe
essential knowledge for proving the total correctness of the procedure (here the automatically in-
troduced constants old_a and old_b denote the values of the program variables a and b before
entering the loop, i.e., in this context, m and n, respectively).
Evaluation, Execution, and Checking Whenever the user saves a specification, it is automatically
syntactically and semantically processed, i.e., parsed, type-checked, and translated into an executable in-
ternal representation (see below for more details on the implementation). Errors are reported by graphical
markers in the editor frame and by textual messages in the output frame.
For the semantic processing, all globally defined constants are immediately evaluated (by evaluating
the defining terms/formulas which may only refer to already previously processed entities). Those natural
number constants whose values have not been defined in the specification receive their values from the
current system settings that the user may control in the graphical interface: by pressing the button “Other
Values” a menu pops up that allows to give values to selected constants; if a constant is not given a value
here, the “Default Value” from the input box in the main window is chosen. Since thus all constants
receive specific values, all types depending on these constants receive an interpretation as specific finite
sets of values (which are internally implemented as lazily evaluated sequences).
The translation proceeds according to either a deterministic or a non-deterministic model of expres-
sion evaluation respectively command execution:
• In the deterministic model, every non-deterministic choice results in only one value; if no value
can be chosen (because of an unsatisfiable side condition F specified in the choice), the program
aborts with an error message.
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• In the non-deterministic model, every non-deterministic choice (ultimately) results in all possible
values; since all types are finite, also the number of choices is finite, such that all expressions can
be evaluated in a finite amount of time.
The non-deterministic model is implemented by translating every expression that may have non-
deterministic semantics to a lazily evaluated sequence of values; the evaluation of an expression re-
spectively execution of a procedure first proceeds according to whatever value is first delivered by all
streams; after that execution, it “backtracks” to the last stream and then proceeds with the value that is
delivered next; if this stream has delivered all values, execution backtracks to the previous stream, and
so on. Thus ultimately the complete “tree” of all possible choices is processed in a depth-first fashion.
However, since in general the non-deterministic model requires the processing of exponentially many
evaluation/execution paths, the deterministic mode is the default; the non-deterministic mode is only
applied, if the user has explicitly checked the selection box “Nondeterminism”.
For all parameterized entities (functions, predicates, theorems, procedures) the menu “Operation”
allows to select the entity; by pressing the “Run” button , the system generates (in a lazy fashion)
all possible combinations of parameter values that satisfy the precondition of the operation, invokes the
operation on each of these, and prints the corresponding result values. If the selection box “Silent” is
checked, the output for each operation is suppressed; however, each execution still checks the correct-
ness of all annotations (preconditions, postconditions, theorems, invariants, termination measures, and
assertions). If the checking thus completes without errors, we have validated that the operation satisfies
the specification for the domains determined by the current choices of the domain bounds.
Example We may check the specification listed in Figure 2 in various ways; for this, in the following
the value N = 20 is used.
First we execute gcd in nondeterministic mode to validate that the specification of the function allows
for every admissible input one and only one output and that this output is indeed the expected one:
Executing gcd(Z,Z) with all 441 inputs.
Ignoring inadmissible inputs...
Branch 0:1 of nondeterministic function gcd(1,0):
Result (0 ms): 1
Branch 1:1 of nondeterministic function gcd(1,0):
No more results (4 ms).
...
Branch 0:440 of nondeterministic function gcd(20,20):
Result (1 ms): 20
Branch 1:440 of nondeterministic function gcd(20,20):
No more results (7 ms).
Execution completed for ALL inputs (5187 ms, 440 checked, 1 inadmissible).
By checking the option Silent we see that that the execution is actually pretty fast (unchecking the
option Nondeterministic would speedup it further by a factor of more than two):
Executing gcd(Z,Z) with all 441 inputs.
Execution completed for ALL inputs (273 ms, 440 checked, 1 inadmissible).
Likewise, checking the theorems proceeds very quickly, e.g.:
Executing gcd2(Z,Z) with all 441 inputs.
Execution completed for ALL inputs (256 ms, 441 checked, 0 inadmissible).
Similarly, we can validate that the procedure satisfies its specification:
Executing gcdp(Z,Z) with all 441 inputs.
Execution completed for ALL inputs (933 ms, 440 checked, 1 inadmissible).
This check indeed evaluates the procedure specification and the embedded loop annotations; if we intro-
duce an error, e.g. by modifying the last line of the procedure to
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return if a = 0 then 0 else a;
the error is immediately detected:
Executing gcdp(Z,Z) with all 441 inputs.
ERROR in execution of gcdp(0,1): evaluation of
ensures result = gcd(m, n);
at line 24 in file gcd.txt:
postcondition is violated by result 0
ERROR encountered in execution.
More uses of the RISCAL checker will be shown in the following sections.
Implementation RISCAL has been implemented in Java (using the Eclipse Standard Widget Toolkit
SWT for its graphical user interface). The executable internal representation of a specification is essen-
tially a Java version of a denotational semantics of the specification, implemented on top of the lambda
expressions introduced in Java 8.
For instance, in the deterministic model, the semantics of a command is a function from contexts
(variable bindings) to contexts. In the non-deterministic model, it is a function from contexts to poten-
tially infinite sequences of contexts; such as sequence is modeled as a function that either returns “null”
denoting the end of the sequence or a pair of a value and another sequence. This framework is expressed
by the following mathematical domain definitions:
ComSem := Single+Multiple
Single := Command→ (Context→ Context)
Multiple := Command→ (Context→ Seq(Context))
Seq(T ) := Unit→ (Null+Next(T,Seq(T )))
Here ComSem represents the (deterministic or non-deterministic) semantics of commands and Seq(T )
represents the domain of sequences of type T . The deterministic semantics of a one-sided conditional
command can be then defined by the following value of type Single:
[if E then C ] := λc.if [E ](c) then [C ](c) else c
Corresponding Java 8 versions of these types are the following:
public static interface ComSem {
public interface Single extends ComSem, Function<Context,Context> { }
public interface Multiple extends ComSem, Function<Context,Seq<Context» { }
}
public interface Seq<T> extends Supplier<Seq.Next<T» {
// public Seq.Next<T> get();
public final static class Next<T> {
public final T head; public final Seq<T> tail;
...
}
}
Here the deterministic semantics of the conditional command can be defined by the following function:
static ComSem.Single ifThenElse(BoolExpSem.Single E, ComSem.Single C)
{ return (Context c) -> E.apply(c) ? C.apply(c) : c; }
In a similar style also the non-deterministic semantics can be defined and implemented based on higher-
order functions for combining functions on sequences of values.
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The model checker applies the executable representation of an operation to all values of the domain
of the operation; this is based on a translation of types to (again lazily evaluated) sequences of values
such that from the interface of a function the sequence of all possible arguments can be generated.
For speeding up the checking of larger models, both a multi-threaded and a distributed version of the
checker have been implemented. The multi-threaded version can be selected by the check box “Multi-
Threaded” where by the input box “Threads” the number of worker threads can be selected. These
threads run on the local computer and iteratively request from the main thread new inputs to which
the chosen operation is to be applied; thus the domain of inputs is processed by all threads in parallel.
Additionally or alternatively the distributed version can be selected by the check box “Distributed” where
by the button “Servers” connections to one or more remote servers can be established. On each server an
instance of RISCAL is started as a separate process to which the main process forwards the specification
for a local translation into the executable form; each server process then repeatedly queries from the
main process a range of inputs which can be processed by multiple threads per server (in addition to the
threads running on the main process). For more details, consult the reference manual [19].
Proof-Based Verification Since RISCAL is based on checking rather than deriving and proving veri-
fication conditions, there is not any direct connection of RISCAL to a verification calculus like Hoare’s
axiomatic system or Dijkstra’s predicate transformers. However, as will be sketched in the following
section, we plan as future work to integrate also such a calculus as a way of validating by checking that
loop invariants are strong enough to carry through proof-based verification over infinite domains.
3 Using RISCAL in Education
RISCAL shall support the education in formal logic with emphasis on the formal specification and ver-
ification of programs respectively algorithms (abstract programs). The particular goal of RISCAL is to
give students immediate feedback about the interpretation and adequacy of formal definitions and specifi-
cations before they attempt to formally prove theorems such as verification conditions for the correctness
of programs. The environment shall thus encourage and support self-paced instruction where students
“play” with multiple variations of definitions, specifications, and annotations, and by the feedback of
the system learn to interpret their meaning, investigate their properties, and judge their appropriateness
for the intended purpose. The goal is to rule out subtle errors in definitions, theorems, specifications,
and annotations which may make subsequent proofs pointless (since the theorem proved does not cap-
ture the informal intention) and/or impossible (since the theorem does actually not hold); thus the major
sources of frustration in dealing with formal methods can be avoided or at least minimized. Only when
by these activities the adequacy of the formal artifacts has been satisfactorily validated, formal proofs
shall be attempted, which by the previous activities have a high (at least much higher) chance of being
both meaningful and successful.
In particular, RISCAL can support the following activities:
1. The formalization of theories: this involves the definition of types, constants, functions, and predi-
cates and the formulation of theorems that claim certain properties of these theories. Subsequently
it has to be validated that these definitions indeed capture the intentions of the human respectively
that the claimed properties are indeed correct.
RISCAL can support this process by evaluating the definitions of functions and predicates for
all (or also just some) possible input values and observing their outputs. Moreover, RISCAL
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may evaluate the theorems for all possible input values (i.e., values for the universally quantified
variables of the theorem) and check their correctness; if a theorem is violated, the system reports
witnesses of the violation (i.e., values for the variables that make the defining formula false).
Additionally, the user may annotate every expression E as print E such that its evaluation prints
the result value as a side-effect; thus the evaluation of terms and formulas can be traced.
2. The specification of algorithms: this involves the definition of pre- and post-conditions of envi-
sioned algorithms. Subsequently it has to be validated that these specifications satisfy certain crite-
ria and indeed describe the intended input/output behavior of the algorithm. In particular, RISCAL
may validate precondition P(x) on input x and postcondition Q(x,y) on input x and output y by the
following activities (for simplicity, we write the following formulas in common mathematical no-
tation, concrete RISCAL counterparts will be subsequently shown):
(a) Check the validity of ∃x.P(x) which verifies that the precondition is satisfiable. If this the-
orem does not hold, the specification is trivial: a proof of correctness of an algorithm with
respect to the specification typically quickly succeeds but is pointless (indeed small logical
errors may lead to the definitions of preconditions that are equivalent to “false”).
(b) Check the validity of ∀x.P(x)⇒∃y.¬Q(x,y)which verifies that the postcondition is not valid,
i.e., not satisfied by every output (if some inputs actually allow arbitrary outputs, alternatively
the weaker theorem ∃x,y.P(x)∧¬Q(x,y) may be checked). If none of these theorems hold,
the specification is trivial: a proof of correctness of an algorithm with respect to the specifi-
cation typically quickly succeeds but is pointless (indeed small logical errors may lead to the
definitions of postconditions that are equivalent to “true”).
(c) Check the validity of ∀x.P(x)⇒ ∃y.Q(x,y). This verifies that the specification is indeed
satisfiable, i.e., that for every input that satisfies the precondition there exists some output
that satisfies the postcondition. If this theorem does not hold, every attempt to prove the
correctness of an algorithm with respect to the specification is a priori doomed to fail.
(d) Optionally, check the validity of ∀x,y1,y2.P(x)∧Q(x,y1)∧Q(x,y2)⇒ y1 = y2. Thus we
verify that the specification defines the output uniquely; this, however, needs not generally
be the case for all specifications (algorithms are often intentionally underspecified).
(e) Evaluate for all inputs the function f (x) requires P(x) := choose y : Q(x,y) which implic-
itly defines its result by the postcondition (if the postcondition defines the result uniquely, the
evaluation may be performed in deterministic mode). By inspecting the function results, we
may validate that the specification indeed describes the expected input/output behavior.
Currently, the various theorems and the implicitly defined function have to be formulated manually
by the user; their automatic generation by RISCAL is planned in the near future.
3. The verification of algorithms: this involves the definition of procedures, their annotation with
specifications, and (optionally) the annotation of loops in the procedure bodies with invariants and
termination measures. The correctness of a procedure and the adequacy of its annotations can be
checked in RISCAL as follows:
(a) Execute the procedure for all possible inputs. This verifies that for all inputs that satisfy
the precondition the procedure result indeed satisfies the postcondition. If loop invariants
and termination measures are given, this also verifies that the invariants are not too strong
(i.e., they hold before and after every loop iteration) and that the termination measures are
adequate (they are decreased by every loop iteration and do not become negative). Thus, if a
termination measure is given, this guarantees the loop to terminate.
130 Teaching Formalization via Automatic Checking
(b) Derive from the procedure specification and the loop annotations verification conditions that
ensure the (partial or total) correctness of the program with respect to the specification and
check these. This in particular verifies that the invariants are “inductive”, i.e, not too weak:
from the fact that the invariant holds before a loop iteration and the fact that the loop condition
holds, it can be concluded that the invariant also holds after the iteration; it also verifies that
from the loop invariant the postcondition of the procedure can be concluded.
Currently, the derivation of verification conditions has to be manually performed by the application
of Hoare calculus respectively Dijkstra’s predicate transformer calculus; their automatic generation
in RISCAL is planned in the near future.
We illustrate some of above activities, concretely the specification and verification of algorithms, by
the following problem: given an array a of n > 0 integers, find the maximum m of a. The corresponding
RISCAL specification is based on the following domains:
val N:N; val M:N;
type index = Z[-N,N]; type elem = Z[-M,M]; type array = Array[N,elem];
Rather than basing our specifications on a single integer type, we use two constants N and M to bound
the types index of array indices/lengths and the type elem of array elements, respectively. The type
array encompasses all arrays of length N; however, the following specification uses a variable n≤ N to
denote the portion of the array actually considered in the problem. In the following checks, we will use
N := 3 and M := 2; thus arrays up to length 3 with values in the interval [−2,2] will be considered.
The problem specification is then captured by the following predicates representing the precondition
and the postcondition of the problem, respectively:
pred Pre(a:array, n:index) ⇔
0 < n ∧ ∀k:index. n ≤ k ∧ k < N ⇒ a[k] = 0;
pred Post(a:array, n:index, m:elem) ⇔
(∃k:index. 0 ≤ k ∧ k < n ∧ m = a[k]) ∧
(∀k:index. 0 ≤ k ∧ k < n ⇒ m ≥ a[k]);
Here the precondition, in addition to requiring n > 0, states that from index n on all array elements are
zero; while not strictly required, this subsequently reduces the model space and thus speeds up all checks.
The specification is then validated with the help of the following declarations that relate to the activ-
ities (2a)–(2e) mentioned above:
theorem preSat ⇔ ∃a:array, n:index. Pre(a, n);
theorem postNotValid(a:array, n:index) ⇔
Pre(a,n) ⇒ ∃m:elem. ¬Post(a,n,m);
theorem postSat(a:array, n:index) ⇔
Pre(a,n) ⇒ ∃m:elem. Post(a,n,m);
theorem resultUnique(a:array, n:index, m1:elem, m2:elem) ⇔
Pre(a,n) ∧ Post(a,n,m1) ∧ Post(a,n,m2) ⇒ m1 = m2;
fun maxFun(a:array, n:index): elem
requires Pre(a,n);
= choose m:elem with Post(a,n,m);
Theorem preSat states that the precondition is satisfiable; since it represents a constant, its value is
immediately computed and checked when the specification is processed. Theorems postNotValid (the
postcondition is not generally valid), postSat (the postcondition is satisfiable), and resultUnique
(the postcondition determines the result uniquely) are individually verified by corresponding calls of the
checker (in non-deterministic mode with silent execution):
Executing postNotValid(Array[Z],Z) with all 875 inputs.
Execution completed for ALL inputs (171 ms, 875 checked, 0 inadmissible).
Executing postSat(Array[Z],Z) with all 875 inputs.
Execution completed for ALL inputs (191 ms, 875 checked, 0 inadmissible).
Executing resultUnique(Array[Z],Z,Z,Z) with all 21875 inputs.
13638 inputs (13638 checked, 0 inadmissible, 0 ignored)...
Execution completed for ALL inputs (3199 ms, 21875 checked, 0 inadmissible).
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We further validate the specification by checking maxFun, now with non-silent execution in deterministic
mode (to reduce the amount of output):
Executing maxFun(Array[Z],Z) with all 875 inputs.
Ignoring inadmissible inputs...
Run 560 of deterministic function maxFun([-2,0,0],1):
Result (0 ms): -2
Run 561 of deterministic function maxFun([-1,0,0],1):
Result (0 ms): -1
...
Run 698 of deterministic function maxFun([1,2,0],2):
Result (0 ms): 2
...
Run 874 of deterministic function maxFun([2,2,2],3):
Result (0 ms): 2
Execution completed for ALL inputs (1146 ms, 155 checked, 720 inadmissible).
Not all nondeterministic branches may have been considered.
Having convinced ourselves about the adequacy of the specification, we turn to the usual algorithm that
solves the specified problem:
proc maxProc(a:array, n:index): elem
requires Pre(a,n);
ensures Post(a,n,result);
{
var m:elem := a[0];
for var i:index:=1; i < n; i:=i+1 do
invariant Invariant(a,n,m,i);
decreases Termination(a,n,m,i);
{
if a[i] > m then m := a[i];
}
return m;
}
The loop is annotated with the help of a predicate Invariant and a function Termination that denote
the invariant and the termination term, respectively:
pred Invariant(a:array, n:index, m:elem, i:index) ⇔
1 ≤ i ∧ i ≤ n ∧
(∃k:index. 0 ≤ k ∧ k < i ∧ m = a[k]) ∧
(∀k:index. 0 ≤ k ∧ k < i ⇒ m ≥ a[k]);
fun Termination(a:array, n:index, m:elem, i:index):index = n-i;
By checking the procedure (activity 3a), we verify its correctness with respect to the specification, and
(partially) validate the adequacy of invariant and termination term:
Executing maxProc(Array[Z],Z) with all 875 inputs.
Execution completed for ALL inputs (93 ms, 155 checked, 720 inadmissible).
For a full validation of the adequacy of the termination term, we derive the usual verification conditions
for proving the total correctness of the algorithm:
theorem VC1(a:array, n:index, m:elem, i:index)
requires Pre(a,n);
⇔ m = a[0] ∧ i = 1 ⇒ Invariant(a,n,m,i);
theorem VC2(a:array, n:index, m:elem, i:index)
requires Pre(a,n);
⇔ Invariant(a,n,m,i) ⇒ Termination(a,n,m,i) ≥ 0;
theorem VC3(a:array, n:index, m:elem, i:index)
requires Pre(a,n);
⇔ Invariant(a,n,m,i) ∧ i < n ∧ a[i] > m ⇒ Invariant(a,n,a[i],i+1) ∧ Termination(a,n,a[i],i+1)≥0;
theorem VC4(a:array, n:index, m:elem, i:index)
requires Pre(a,n);
⇔ Invariant(a,n,m,i) ∧ i < n ∧ ¬(a[i] > m) ⇒ Invariant(a,n,m,i+1) ∧ Termination(a,n,m,i+1) ≥ 0;
theorem VC5(a:array, n:index, m:elem, i:index)
requires Pre(a,n);
⇔ Invariant(a,n,m,i) ∧ ¬(i < n) ⇒ Post(a,n,m);
132 Teaching Formalization via Automatic Checking
All of these conditions are now checked in silent mode:
Executing VC1(Array[Z],Z,Z,Z) with all 30625 inputs.
18714 inputs (3255 checked, 15459 inadmissible, 0 ignored)...
Execution completed for ALL inputs (3188 ms, 5425 checked, 25200 inadmissible).
...
Executing VC5(Array[Z],Z,Z,Z) with all 30625 inputs.
21638 inputs (3725 checked, 17913 inadmissible, 0 ignored)...
Execution completed for ALL inputs (2838 ms, 5425 checked, 25200 inadmissible).
Thus the algorithm is correct and the invariant is adequate for arrays of lengths up to N = 3 with absolute
element values up to M = 2. In order to verify the correctness of the algorithm for arbitrary N and M
we may pass above conditions to a system that supports real (automated or interactive) reasoning such as
the RISC ProofNavigator [17]. If it can be shown that above verification conditions hold for arbitrary N
and M, the algorithm is indeed generally correct.
4 Sample Specifications
Since the release of the first version of RISCAL in March 2017, we have started to develop first proto-
types of formally checked specifications. They are intended to serve as the nucleus of a future compre-
hensive library and accompanying lecture materials to be used in the class room and for self-instructed
learning in degree programmes for computer science and mathematics. The specifications include ar-
eas such as array-based algorithms, logic, number theory, discrete mathematics, and computer algebra.
Sample specifications from two of these domains are described in somewhat more detail below.
4.1 Number Theory
In [8], we describe the application of RISCAL to number-theoretic algorithms that arise in, e.g., cryp-
tography. In such algorithms, prime numbers play an important role; thus as our first example we pick
the problem of generating, for a given bound n ∈ N, all prime numbers less than equal n: formally, we
wish to compute every p ∈ N with p≤ n that satisfies the following predicate isPrime(p):
isPrime(p) :⇔ p > 1∧∀n ∈ N. n|p⇒ n = 1∨n = p
Here the predicate n|p (“n divides p”) is defined as usual as n|p :⇔∃m ∈ N. n ·m = p.
The corresponding declarations in RISCAL are now as follows:
val N: N; type nat = N[N];
pred divides(n:nat,p:nat) ⇔ ∃m:nat. n·m = p;
pred isPrime(p:nat) ⇔ p > 1 ∧ ∀n:nat. divides(n,p) ⇒ n = 1 ∨ n = p;
Here we first introduce the type nat of all natural numbers up to some maximum N and then define the
predicates divides(m,n) representing m|n and isPrime(p) in the natural way.
The classic algorithm for the solution of this problem is the “Sieve of Eratosthenes”. From the
educational point of view, this algorithm has the advantage that it is easily understandable even to high
school students and, furthermore, that it gives us the opportunity to present two variants of an algorithm:
a “mathematical” one that is described on a higher level of abstraction (by operating on sets), and a
“computational” one that is more implementation oriented (by operating on arrays).
In both variants, the algorithm is based on the following fundamental knowledge.
Theorem 1 (Least Proper Divisor). Let n be a natural number greater equal 2. Then the least proper
divisor m > 1 of n is a prime.
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Proof. Let m > 1 be the least proper divisor of n. We assume that m is not a prime and show a contra-
diction. Since m is a divisor of n, there exists some m′ ∈ N with n = m ·m′. Since m is not a prime, there
exists some o ∈ N with o 6= 1 and o 6= m such that o|m. Therefore there also exists some o′ ∈ N with
o′ 6= 1 and o′ 6= m and m = o · o′. Therefore, we have n = m ·m′ = o · o′ ·m′. But then o < m is also a
divisor of n, i.e., m is not the least divisor, which contradicts our assumption.
While this argument can be easily understood by students, we can give the theorem further credibility
by formulating it in RISCAL:
theorem leastProperDivisor(n:nat,m:nat) ⇔
n ≥ 2 ∧ m > 1 ∧ divides(m,n) ∧ (∀m0:nat. m0 > 1 ∧ divides(m0,n) ⇒ m ≤ m0)
⇒ isPrime(m);
Now checking the theorem with for example N = 30 yields
Executing leastProperDivisor(Z,Z) with all 961 inputs.
Execution completed for ALL inputs (95 ms, 961 checked, 0 inadmissible).
which validates its correctness even without proof.
This theorem forms the basis of the Sieve of Eratosthenes: starting with the prime number candi-
dates 2, . . . ,n, we repeatedly pick the smallest value (which by above theorem is a prime) and remove it
together with its multiples (which by definition are not primes); this process is repeated until no more
candidate is left. In the following, we give two formulations of this algorithm.
Sieve of Eratosthenes (Set-Based) The following algorithm computes for given n ∈ N the set P of all
values p≤ n with isPrime(p,n):
Algorithm 1 Compute the set P of all primes less than equal n ∈ N.
Ensure: P = {p | p ∈ N∧ p≤ n∧ isPrime(p)}
1: P← /0
2: C←{2, . . . ,n}
3: while C 6= /0 do
4: p←min(C)
5: P← P∪{p}
6: C←{c ∈C : p 6 | c}
This algorithm can be formalized in RISCAL (in the most elegant way) as follows:
proc SieveOfEratosthenesSet(n:nat): Set[nat]
ensures result = { p | p:nat with p ≤ n ∧ isPrime(p) };
{
var P:Set[nat] := /0[nat];
var C:Set[nat] := 2..n;
choose p∈C with ∀c∈C. p ≤ c do
{
P := P ∪ {p};
C := { c | c∈C with ¬divides(p,c) };
}
return P;
}
The construct choose ... do ... repeatedly chooses the minimum value p from the set C of candi-
dates, puts it as the next prime number into set P, and removes it together with its multiples from C; the
process terminates, when no more choice is possible (i.e., when C is empty).
A general proof of correctness of the algorithm can be based on the following loop annotations:
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invariant P = { p | p:nat with p ≤ n ∧ isPrime(p) ∧ ∀c∈C. p < c };
invariant C ⊆ 2..n;
decreases |C|;
Here the invariants demonstrate that P contains, at every iteration of the loop, all primes that are less than
equal n and less than equal the minimum of C. Thus, when the loop terminates with C = /0, P holds all
primes less than equal n. Since the termination term |C| indicates that the size of C is decreased in every
loop iteration, this is indeed eventually the case. Checking the algorithm with N = 30
Executing SieveOfEratosthenesSet(Z) with all 31 inputs.
Execution completed for ALL inputs (746 ms, 31 checked, 0 inadmissible).
validates both that the algorithm satisfies its contract and that the loop annotations are correct (if they
should not be sufficient for a proof, they are at least not too strong).
Sieve of Eratosthenes (Array-Based) The following algorithm computes for given n ∈N the Boolean
array P of length n such that P[p] has value “true” if and only if the property isPrime(p) holds:
Algorithm 2 Compute the Boolean array P which indicates all primes less than equal n ∈ N.
Ensure: ∀p ∈ N. p≤ n⇒ (P[p] = T⇔ isPrime(p))
1: P← (T,T, . . . ,T) ∈ Bn+1;
2: P[0],P[1]← F;
3: for p from 2 while p · p≤ n by 1 do
4: if P[p] = T then
5: for k from 2 while p · k ≤ n by 1 do
6: P[p · k]← F
This algorithm is in essence a refinement of the set-based algorithm, where the Boolean array P takes
the role of both sets P and C: all array values at indices less than p already indicate the prime status of
the indices while all indices greater than equal p are the candidates that remain to be processed. The
outer loop looks for the next smallest prime number p; when such a p is found, its greater multiples are
removed from the candidates. The algorithm can be formalized in RISCAL as follows:
proc SieveOfEratosthenesArray(n:nat): Array[N+1,Bool]
ensures ∀p:nat with p ≤ n. result[p] ⇔ isPrime(p);
{
var P:Array[N,Bool] := Array[N+1,Bool](>);
P[0] := ⊥; P[1] := ⊥;
for var p:nat := 2; p·p ≤ n; p := p+1 do
{
if P[p] then
{
for var k:nat := 2; p·k ≤ N; k := k+1 do
P[p·k] := ⊥;
}
}
return P;
}
A verification of the algorithm can be based on the following annotations of the outer loop:
invariant 2 ≤ p ∧ (p-1)·(p-1) ≤ n;
invariant ∀j:nat with j < p. P[j] ⇔ isPrime(j);
invariant ∀j:nat with 2 ≤ j ∧ j < p. ∀k:nat with j < k. divides(j,k) ⇒ ¬P[k];
decreases n-p+2;
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The invariants essentially state that the prime status for all positions less than p has been already deter-
mined and all positions from p on do not hold multiples of the smaller values. Correspondingly we have
the following annotations of the inner loop:
invariant 2 ≤ k ∧ (p-1)·k ≤ N;
invariant ∀j:nat with 2 ≤ j ∧ j < k. ¬P[p·j];
decreases N-k;
Here the invariants essentially state that all multiples p · j with j < k have already removed as prime
number candidates. Checking also this algorithm with N = 30
Executing SieveOfEratosthenesArray(Z) with all 31 inputs.
Execution completed for ALL inputs (171 ms, 31 checked, 0 inadmissible).
again validates both that the algorithm satisfies its contract and that the loop annotations are correct (if
they should not be sufficient for a proof, they are at least not too strong).
It is generally a challenging task to come up with completely correct formalizations that in particular
also hold at the boundaries of iteration respectively quantification ranges. From an educational point
of view, failures reported by the checker are a valuable way to learn to take extra care of boundary
conditions and special cases; these situations may be easily overlooked by a human but are also easily
handled by automatic checking.
4.2 Discrete Mathematics
In [3], chosen theories from discrete mathematics have been formalized in RISCAL. This includes the
development of the mathematical theories, the specification of algorithms and their annotation with meta-
information. The concepts have been validated on small finite domains which should work as a ground
layer for further verification on models of arbitrary size. This approach should save much time by quickly
finding errors in considerations, because in most cases errors in the specifications and annotations from
the generalized concepts also appear in the finite domains.
A big focus in the elaborations lies on drawing the connections between different ways of describing
an algorithm/function, which leads to a deeper understanding of the underlying theories. Most functions
we have defined in three variants: implicitly by a condition that the result shall fulfill (by a RISCAL term
of form choose I:T with P, which denotes a value I of type T with property P), explicitly by a con-
structive (generally recursive) description how to find the result (which requires a termination measure
to ensure the well-definedness of the definition), and finally procedurally by the execution of a sequence
of commands that update the values of variables.
We demonstrate these connections by the problem of computing the transitive closure of a binary
relation based on the following mathematical concepts.
Definition 1 (Relation). R is a binary relation on E if it is a set of pairs of elements of E, i.e., R⊆ E×E.
If E is fixed from the context, then we call R just a relation.
We define correspondingly in RISCAL the type of binary relations on the set of numbers {0, . . . ,N} for
some maximum N ∈ N:
val N:N;
type elem = N[N];
type pair = Tuple[elem,elem];
type relation = Set[pair];
Definition 2 (Transitivity). A binary relation R on E is transitive if, whenever 〈x,y〉 ∈ R and 〈y,z〉 ∈ R,
then 〈x,z〉 ∈ R, for all x,y,z ∈ E.
In RISCAL we define this property by the following predicate:
pred isTransitive(r:relation) ⇔ ∀x∈r,y∈r. (x.2 = y.1) ⇒ 〈x.1,y.2〉 ∈ r;
Based on these fundamental definitions we can now specify the central problem of this section.
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Problem Specification and Implicit Definition Our problem is to compute the transitive closure of a
given binary relation based on the following definition.
Definition 3 (Transitive Closure). S is the transitive closure of relation R, if S is the smallest transitive
relation S that contains R, i.e., S is a subset of every transitive relation that contains R.
The corresponding RISCAL definition is:
pred isTransitiveClosure(r:relation,s:relation) ⇔
r ⊆ s ∧ isTransitive(s) ∧
(∀s0:relation. r ⊆ s0 ∧ isTransitive(s0) ⇒ s ⊆ s0);
We claim that the transitive closure of every relation indeed exists and, furthermore, is uniquely defined:
theorem transitiveClosureExists(r:relation) ⇔
∃s:relation. isTransitiveClosure(r,s);
theorem transitiveClosureIsUnique(r:relation) ⇔
∀s1:relation with isTransitiveClosure(r,s1).
∀s2:relation with isTransitiveClosure(r,s2).
s1 = s2;
These properties can be quickly validated for N = 2:
Executing transitiveClosureExists(Set[Tuple[Z,Z]]) with all 512 inputs.
Execution completed for ALL inputs (675 ms, 512 checked, 0 inadmissible).
Executing transitiveClosureIsUnique(Set[Tuple[Z,Z]]) with all 512 inputs.
362 inputs (362 checked, 0 inadmissible, 0 ignored)...
Execution completed for ALL inputs (2648 ms, 512 checked, 0 inadmissible).
Thus we can implicitly define a function which chooses a relation that satisfies the required property:
fun transitiveClosureI(r:relation):relation =
choose s:relation with isTransitiveClosure(r,s);
To validate our definitions, we can execute this function for all possible inputs and inspect its results
(because the result is uniquely defined, deterministic execution suffices):
Executing transitiveClosureI(Set[Tuple[Z,Z]]) with all 512 inputs.
Run 0 of deterministic function transitiveClosureI({}):
Result (3 ms): {}
...
Run 106 of deterministic function transitiveClosureI({[1,0],[0,1],[2,1],[0,2]}):
Result (1 ms): {[0,0],[1,0],[2,0],[0,1],[1,1],[2,1],[0,2],[1,2],[2,2]}
...
Execution completed for ALL inputs (4242 ms, 512 checked, 0 inadmissible).
Not all nondeterministic branches may have been considered.
Explicit (Recursive) Definition A natural approach to compute the transitive closure of a relation r as
a recursive function is based on the following fundamental steps:
1. If r is transitive, then we are finished and r is our result.
2. Otherwise r contains some pairs 〈x,z〉 and 〈z,y〉 that violate the transitivity of r in the sense that
〈x,y〉 is not in r. We thus add 〈x,y〉 to r and continue with step (1).
Indeed, in step (2) of the algorithm we may consider all violating pairs and add to r all the mending pairs
at once. The corresponding function can be defined in RISCAL as follows:
fun transitiveClosureR(r:relation):relation
ensures isTransitiveClosure(r,result);
decreases 2^((N+1)^2)-|r|;
= if isTransitive(r) then
r
else
transitiveClosureR(r ∪
{ 〈x,y〉 | x:elem,y:elem with ∃p∈r,q∈r. (x = p.1 ∧ y = q.2 ∧ p.2 = q.1) });
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The termination of this function is guaranteed by the measure stated in the decrease clause; its correct-
ness follows from the fact that the size |r| of r is increased in every recursive invocation; however, since
we have only N+1 elements, there are at most (N+1)2 pairs in r, thus |r| can be at most 2(N+1)2 .
The partial correctness of this algorithm is a direct consequence of the following theorem on which
a later verification may be based:
theorem transitiveClosureCorrectness(r:relation) ⇔
if isTransitive(r) then
isTransitiveClosure(r,r)
else
let s = r ∪ { 〈x,y〉 | x:elem,y:elem with ∃p∈r,q∈r. (x = p.1 ∧ y = q.2 ∧ p.2 = q.1) } in
∀t:relation. isTransitiveClosure(r ∪ s,t) ⇒ isTransitiveClosure(r,t);
Both the algorithm and the correctness theorem may be quickly validated for N = 2:
Executing transitiveClosureR(Set[Tuple[Z,Z]]) with all 512 inputs.
Execution completed for ALL inputs (699 ms, 512 checked, 0 inadmissible).
Executing transitiveClosureCorrectness(Set[Tuple[Z,Z]]) with all 512 inputs.
Execution completed for ALL inputs (1148 ms, 512 checked, 0 inadmissible).
Procedural Definition Another algorithm which may be easiest expressed as a procedure is based on
the following main steps:
1. We initialize the result variable res with the empty set and an auxiliary variable new with r.
2. We choose some pair x ∈ new and check for every pair y ∈ res, if the combination of x and y
violates the transitivity of res. If yes, add to new the pair that mends the violation.
3. We add x to res, remove it from new and continue with step (2).
4. When new becomes empty, the algorithm terminates and we return res as its result.
In more detail, the algorithm can be formulated in RISCAL as follows:
proc transitiveClosureP(r:relation):relation
ensures isTransitiveClosure(r,result);
{
var res:relation := /0[pair];
var new:relation := r;
choose x ∈ new do
{
for y ∈ res do
{
if x.1 = y.2 ∧ ¬(〈y.1,x.2〉 ∈ res) then
new := new ∪ { 〈y.1, x.2〉 };
if x.2 = y.1 ∧ ¬(〈x.1,y.2〉 ∈ res) then
new := new ∪ { 〈x.1,y.2〉 };
}
res := res ∪ { x };
new := new \ { x };
}
return res;
}
The termination of the algorithm can be guaranteed by adding the termination measure
decreases 2^((N+1)^2)-|res|;
to the outer loop. Similar to the recursive algorithm, its correctness follows from the fact that the size of
res is increases by every loop iteration but cannot exceed 2(N+1)
2
.
The partial correctness of the algorithm follows from the following invariants of the outer loop:
invariant res ∩ new = /0[pair];
invariant res ∪ new ⊆ transitiveClosureI(r);
invariant ∀s∈res,t∈res with s.2 = t.1. 〈s.1,t.2〉 ∈ res ∨ 〈s.1,t.2〉 ∈ new;
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From the second invariant, we know that in every loop iteration res is a subset of the transitive closure.
Since the loop terminates when new is the empty set, the third invariant implies that then res is transitive
and thus itself the transitive closure.
The correctness of the invariant of the outer proof has to be verified with the help of the invariant of
the inner loop:
invariant new = old_new
∪ { 〈y0.1,x.2〉 | y0 ∈ forSet with x.1 = y0.2 ∧ ¬〈y0.1,x.2〉 ∈ res }
∪ { 〈x.1,y0.2〉 | y0 ∈ forSet with x.2 = y0.1 ∧ ¬〈x.1,y0.2〉 ∈ res };
This invariant explicitly describes which values have been added after the termination of the loop to the
original value of new (special variable old_new) to get the new value.
The correctness of the algorithm with respect to its specification and the correctness of the annota-
tions may be quickly validated for N = 2:
Executing transitiveClosureP(Set[Tuple[Z,Z]]) with all 512 inputs.
Execution completed for ALL inputs (1217 ms, 512 checked, 0 inadmissible).
Not all nondeterministic branches may have been considered.
Both loops have been expressed by non-deterministic iteration constructs choose and for which may
select the respective elements in arbitrary order; here deterministic execution has been selected in order
to avoid the combinatorial explosion of execution branches.
With the help of the RISCAL support for parallelism, it is also possible to check larger domain
instances. For instance, we may check the instance N = 3 with 4 threads on the local computer and 16
threads on a remote server in a considerable but still manageable amount of time:
Executing transitiveClosureP(Set[Tuple[Z,Z]]) with all 65536 inputs.
...
PARALLEL execution with 4 local threads and 1 remote servers (output disabled).
...
Execution completed for ALL inputs (870524 ms, 65536 checked, 0 inadmissible).
Not all nondeterministic branches may have been considered.
However, as emphasized before, the point of RISCAL is not so much in verifying specifications but
finding errors; typically such errors already arise in small domain instances that allow quicker checking.
5 Conclusions and Further Work
RISCAL is still in its infancy with first contents having been developed and first classroom experience
having been gained; subsequent experience with the use of RISCAL will shape the further development
of language and system. This will proceed along several possible strands:
• We will automatize the generation of formulas for the validation of specifications and of verifica-
tion conditions for the proof-based verification of algorithms over arbitrary size domains.
• As a (potentially more efficient) alternative to formula evaluation, we will translate formulas into
a suitable theory of the SMT-LIB library and apply SMT solvers for checking their validity.
• We will investigate the visualization of formula evaluation in order to give students quick feedback
why a formula is not valid.
• We will export formulas to some external prover(s) such as the RISC ProofNavigator to allow the
seamless proof-based verification of formulas over arbitrary size domains.
Most important, however, we want to develop a library of specifications and accommodating lecture
materials that shall support the self-study of students in the formalization of mathematical theories and
algorithms with the ultimate goal of self-paced and self-instructed learning.
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